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ABSTRACT 
 
By reducing the risk of unwanted parenthood, better contraception reduces the cost of 
unmarried sex, increasing the value of single life. A simple one-period example 
suggests this could explain why marriage and birth rates have declined since 1970. 
We extend the analysis to allow for repeated matching over many periods, modelling 
the shotgun-marriage, contraception-method and abortion margins. We use US survey 
data on contraception, sexual activity and family dynamics to calibrate the model to 
the 1970s; we find that the effects of liberalizing access to contraception and abortion 
account for 60% of the behavioural shifts associated with the sexual revolution. 
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, oral contraceptives were made legally available to unmarried women in the
US. Although first approved for public use in 1960, and available to all married women since
1965, the pill was not available to unmarried women in all states until the Supreme Court
decision Eisenstadt v. Baird in 1972. This technology was much more eﬀective than other
existing methods; according to Trussell et al. (1990) the pill reduced “typical-use” pregnancy
rates of sexually-active women from 20% annually (condoms/IUD) to 5%. Empirical analysis
by Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) has revealed that legal access to the pill had
an immediate and profound impact on young women’s marriage, fertility and labor-market
outcomes.
In this light, it is somewhat paradoxical that unmarried birth rates are much higher
now than they were in 1970. According to Ventura and Bachrach (2000), the birth rate to
unmarried women in the 20-24 age range rose less than 4% per year in 1970 to nearly 8%
in 1994. Together, the decline in marriage rates and the rise in marriage rates generated a
share of births to unmarried women that reached 32.6% in 1994; by 2007, 40% of births were
to unmarried women 1.
Among births between 1999 and 2002, 77% of those to married women were intended
at conception, compared to only 35% of those to never-married. women.2 This rise in
unmarried birth rates from unintended conceptions is particularly problematic for a story in
which improved contraception reduces the risk of unplanned parenthood.3
A similar trend is seen in the UK, where the unmarried share of births rose 1.6 percentage
points in the decade preceding the 1974 NHS reorganization Act, which made all contracep-
tives available free of charge regardless of marital status. In the following decade, the share
rose 8.3 points, 5 times faster. By 1995, the unmarried share of births in the UK stood at
33%, up from 5% in 1960. Most of the non-marital births currently are ’Sole registrations’;
1For the 2007 figure, see NCHS Data Brief No. 18, May 2009, Changing Patterns of Non-marital Child-
bearing in the United States. . .
2NHS Reports No. 51, April 2012: Fertility of Men and Women Aged 15 to 44 Years in the United States:
National Survey of Family Growth, 2006-2010.
3Trends in unmarried cohabitation , while significant, are far from being the whole story; before the 1990s
the share of cohabitants among unmarried women in the U.S. was negligible. As late as 1995, only 10% of
never-married women aged 18-44 had ever cohabited. Among women aged 20-24, the group most likely to
cohabit, only 12% were currently cohabiting. Since then there has been tremendous growth in cohabitation,
but even in 2008, only 28% of unmarried births were to cohabiting couples. With regards to parents the
situation is even starker: according to GPO (2000) less than 2 percent of children lived with two cohabiting
(i.e. non-married) biological parents in 1995. Statistics from Bramlett MD and Mosher WD. Cohabitation,
Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United States. National Center for Health Statistics andVital
Health Stat 23(22). 2002. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Current Population Reports P20-563 Fertility of
American Women: 2008.
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i.e. no father is registered with the birth. These currently account for 30% of all UK births.4
In principle, if the elasticity of sexual activity is suﬃciently high, then an increase in
pregnancy rates can result from a reduced risk of pregnancy per sexually active woman.
Abma and Sonenstein (2001) report that the fraction of females aged 15–19 years who have
ever had sexual intercourse increased from 30% to 50% from 1971 to 1995. In this paper, we
look at more direct evidence of sexual activity of unmarried women and find that, between
the late 1960s and the mid 1990s, this nearly tripled. However we saw above that the pill
reduced pregnancy rates by a factor of 4, so increased sexual activity alone is not enough to
explain the doubling of unmarried birth rates.
Akerlof et al. (1996) (AYK) made the important empirical point that it was the sharp
decline in the marriage rate of pregnant women, rather than an increase in the pregnancy
rate, that contributed most to the rise in unmarried births in the 1970s. In our empirical
section below, we decompose, into 9 diﬀerent margins, the change in unmarried birth rates
between the 1970s and the 1990s and extend the AYK finding: had the marriage rates of
pregnant women remained constant, the birth rate to unmarried women would have declined
30%.
AYK develop a model of the decline of “shotgun weddings” in which a social norm requir-
ing an unmarried couple to marry on pregnancy is undermined by the introduction of the
pill and abortion. This theoretical aspect of the AYK argument would lead one to expect a
dramatic decline in the fraction of marriages with a birth within 9 months of the wedding;
the fraction has declined, as we show in this paper, but in a modest way, from 11% to 10%
of marriages. Moreover virtually all of this decline is explained by composition eﬀects: there
is no decline for brides age 25 or younger; in fact the rate doubles for young women with
previous children. This suggests that the decline in the marriage rate of pregnant women
was driven by the decline in marriage rates more generally.
We propose a simple economic mechanism linking the decline of marriage to the advent
of superior birth-control options (i.e. the pill and abortion). The premise is that people
enjoy sex, but the prospect of unmarried motherhood would deter unmarried people from
participating in the absence of birth control. The advent of better birth-control options
reduces the gains from marriage by raising the sexual activity rates of unmarried people.
This of course reduces the incentives to marry, whether pregnant or not, as unmarried
mothers also benefit from improved birth control.
Can this mechanism generate realistic shifts in the rates of marriage and unmarried
births? We first answer this question by developing a simple one-period model in which
unmarried people must decide between searching for partners for casual sex or for marriage.
4ONS Statistical Bulletin: Live births in England and Wales by characteristics of mother 2010.
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We find that as the eﬀectiveness of birth control increases, both the unmarried birth rate and
the share of births follow a hump shape. As the failure rate of birth control in our example
decreases from 20% to 5%, the share of births to unmarried women rises from 10% to 35%,
and marriage rates fall from 30% to 10%, echoing the patterns in the US data. To explain
the empirical shifts, the economic conditions required are merely a relatively high surplus
from unmarried sex and a large penalty for unmarried births.
The most obvious shortcoming of the one-period argument is that neither the value of
marriage nor that of unmarried motherhood are modeled, but it is surely the diﬀerence
between the two that constitutes the penalty for unmarried births. This raises an important
question: if the argument is extended to a world with many periods, how well would this
mechanism be able to match the changes in each of the contributing factors discussed above?
It is not an easy question to answer, because it requires a model of the various margins
required to produce an unmarried birth: sexual activity, contraception usage by method,
abortion, and of course, marriage.
In Kennes and Knowles (2010), we developed a model in which unmarried birth rates and
marriage rates were jointly determined in a directed-search equilibrium. The model allowed
people to make their choices over many periods, and kept track of the number of children
women accumulate over time. The current model builds on these features, which make
it relatively straightforward to parameterize our model to annual data. The earlier paper
however abstracted from the sexual-activity, contraception-method and abortion margins
and thus could not explore the questions about the roles of shotgun marriage and birth
control. These margins do not over-burden the theory with complexity, as it is separable
into two components that can be solved separately; the optimal response of the fertility
margins to incentives, and the generation of those incentives through equilibrium matching.
Marriages can arise from matchings in the sex market, but matching in the marriage
market precludes pre-marital sex, so we can identify the rate of “shotgun” marriages with
those marriages which produce children in the first period of the marriage. The choice
between markets is critical for the analysis, as the low share of shotgun marriages in the
data, combined with the low rate of sexual activity and the relatively high rates of marriage
among pregnant women in the 1970s, suggests that only a small fraction of marriages in the
1970s arose from sexual matchings.
We parametrize a "benchmark" version of the model so that women’s behavior in the
model matches empirical targets drawn from the 1973 wave of the National Survey of Family
Growth (NSFG). As is now standard in calibration of search models (cf Andolfatto (1996),
Shimer (2005b)), these targets are comprised of transition rates, which in our case are com-
prised of the average rates of sexual activity, marriage, and births. We also include in the
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targets the rates of contraception and pregnancy among sexually active women and the rates
of abortion and marriage among pregnant women. To construct these targets, we construct,
from probit regression estimates, empirical age profiles that are purged of the eﬀects of vari-
ables omitted from the model, such as education and cohabitation, and that condition on
the number of previous children the women have. To set the eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent con-
traception methods we rely on the “typical-use” pregnancy rates reported by Trussell et al.
(1990).
We begin with a very simple calibration; women can have at most one child, and only
childless women can be active in the markets. If we rule out shotgun marriages and abortion,
then we can replicate the result of the one-period model; the advent of the pill reduces mar-
riage rates and drives up unmarried birth rates. When we re-calibrate the 1990s parameters
for access to the pill to match usage rates in the 1990s, these eﬀects are similar in size to
their empirical analogs. The contraception hypothesis works therefore in a lifecycle context
with endogenous birth probabilities and realistic marriage rates.
We then turn to the AYK hypothesis by allowing for shotgun marriages. Unlike AYK,
we assume that couples can commit to marrying in the event of pregnancy. We extend
the previous calibration for the 1970s so as to match the rate of marriages among pregnant
unmarried women. We then carry out a re-calibration experiment analogous to the one
above, reparameterizing the cost of contraception and the distribution of match-quality in
the sex market, so as to match both the usage rates of the pill (by marital status) and the
shotgun marriage rate in the 1995 NSFG. The result is that the marriage rate increases
slightly and the sexual activity rate actually declines. This is because the declining value of
the shotgun option reduces the value of unmarried sex far more than the impact of the pill
can raise it. Our result confirms the problem with taking a simplistic view of AYK, who are
forced instead to argue that many women are reluctantly driven into sex by competition for
potential husbands.
The problem with generating higher unmarried birth rates from an increase in unmarried
sexual activity turns out to be that the analysis so far has abstracted from the sexual
activity of unmarried mothers. If these women are shut out of the matching markets, then
an increase in the surplus from sex increases the incentive to avoid an unmarried birth. In
fact, the data show that sexual activity rates among unmarried women in the 1973 NSFG
were much higher for mothers (roughly 70% active, compared to 20% for non-mothers) ;
indeed mothers accounted for 49% of the unmarried birth rate in the 1970s, despite their
relative scarcity.
We therefore allow unmarried mothers to match in either market. Even when we restrict
the model to match the sex, marriage and birth rates of single mothers, the model is now able
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to generate a significant increase in unmarried birth rates while the shotgun rate declines
sharply. The reason is that single motherhood becomes more attractive relative to a shotgun
marriage when mothers are allowed to match. All previous analysis of the sexual revolution,
with the exception of Regalia and Ríos-Rull (1999), who abstract from sexual activity and
birth control, excludes unmarried mothers from the analysis; we find this to be critical.
We find that once we allow unmarried mothers to match and have more more children,
the calibrated model implies that improved birth control can account for 60% of the sexual
revolution: the decline of marriage, the rise in unmarried birth rates, and the decline of
shotgun marriage.
Although AYK and Regalia and Ríos-Rull (1999) are the most relevant predecessors of
our paper, there have been several other papers that focused on the role of contraception
technology in the marital revolution. However, like AYK, these papers abstract from any
consideration of the dynamics that arise from repeated fertility and marriage opportuni-
ties.Greenwood and Guner (2005) also relies on social norms to model the segregation of
young singles into sexually promiscuous and abstinent groups in response to improvements
in contraception technology. In Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013), improved contraception
causes the decline of the stigma asociated with unmarried births. Chiappori and Oreﬃce
(2008) analyze marriage and bargaining in a frictionless matching model where women diﬀer
in their preferences for children; they show that improved birth-control only makes women
better oﬀ if it is available to single women.
By including decisions that lead to irreversible outcomes (fertility), this paper, like Kennes
and Knowles (2010), contribute to a recent literature on equilibrium search with investment
decisions, such as Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Burdett and Coles (2001). However by
considering the choice between search in the sex and the marriage markets, the current paper
also contributes to a new literature on search with a choice between competing markets.
2 EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
The goal of this section is to document the main empirical points made in the introduction
and to provide targets for calibration. These empirical points include the decline of marriage
rates, and the rise in unmarried women’s sexual activity and the rate of births to unmarried
women, as well as contraception methods. We will use several waves of the National Survey
of Family growth to provide a statistical description of the changes between the 1970s and
1990s in terms of contraception and sexual activity of unmarried women, beginning with
a highly aggregate approach, and then proceeding to decompose the changes over time by
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the number of children the women already have. Of course all of these changes have been
described in other publications, but for our purposes, as this section demonstrates, it is
important to measure the changes conditional on age and education, as the distribution of
these variables changes both over time and by marital and parental histories. There are two
reasons that we need bespoke statistics, rather than previously published results. First, our
theoretical analysis excludes the eﬀects of aging and of education, so we would like to analyze
empirical analogs in which these eﬀects have been removed. Second, in order to model the
consequences of unmarried births, it would seem essential to consider the behavior of women
after these births occur.
2.1 The NSFG samples for 1973 and 1995
In what follows analysis of the US population is often based on our computations from the
National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), a national survey of women aged 15-44. In each
wave women are asked retrospective questions about contraception use and sexual activity.
Complete birth and marital histories are collected as well.
We mainly rely on two waves, 1973 and 1995. It should be noted that single women
are only included in the NSFG 1973 wave if they were previously married or are cohabiting
with an own child. For some of the analysis in this section, we can repair this omission. We
reweigh the survey by using the 1970 Census to account for these excluded women, grouping
them into cells by age and education level, so that the proportions of these women in each
cell match the 1970 census. The details of this procedure are in the appendix.5 Obviously
this will not allow us to construct representative samples for statistics that are not available
in the census, but is useful for tracking variables such as education, marriages and births.
The means of our samples, by marital and parental status are reported in Table X. It is
immediately apparent that important variables such as age, education and whether a woman
was previously married vary widely across the four categories we report. We consider both
education and aging outside the scope of this study, but as it is clearly an important correlate
of the behavior that we analyze, we will follow a simple two-part strategy for most of our
analysis. We focus the analysis on describing, as we did in the introduction, the aggregate
changes that motivate the paper. However we also present the results of a probit analysis in
which age, number of children, education, cohabitation and previous marriages are included
as controls. The tables of estimates will be relegated to the appendix; the discussion will rely
instead on age profiles in which the estimated eﬀects of education etc have been removed.
In this way we hope to show that the aggregate facts are not driven solely by changes in the
5We also show there that the distribution over single moms by age and education was stable between the
1970 census and the 1973 wave of the March CPS.
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distribution of age, education, cohabitation or history of the diﬀerent categories of women
in the sample.
2.2 Birth Rates and the “decline” of Shotgun marriage.
Ventura shows that the fraction of births accounted for by births to unmarried mothers
increased in the US from about 5% in 1940 to 35% by 1999. How seriously should we take
this change? If it is just that couples who have decided to live together and raise children
are less likely to formally marry? In Table 1 we show the change in the unmarried share of
births to 1995 along with other measures of family decline: the fraction of children living
with single mothers has increased 69% over the period 6, the fraction of mothers who are
unmarried rose 127%, and the fraction of children living with both parents declined 24%7.
Table 1 also suggests that the rise in the unmarried share is not just an artifact of
declining marriage rates: the birth rate to unmarried women increased from 2.7% in 1970
to 4.6% in 1995. In Table 2 we decompose the change into the eﬀect of rising birth rate and
of rising population share of unmarried women. In the first two columns of the first three
rows we show statistics from Ventura : the fraction of women married, the birth rate to
married women, and the birth rate to unmarried. In rows 5 and 6 we show, for each year,
the unmarried birth share; in row 5 the share implied by the statistics in the upper rows,
and below the share reported by Ventura. There is some discrepancy, presumably to do with
the original data sources being based on diﬀerent samples, but the unmarried share in the
two rows are similar. In the rightmost three columns we show the eﬀect of holding constant
two of the determining factors at the 1970 level and setting the third to the 1995 level. The
message, as shown in Row 7, is that on its own the birth rate accounts for 22% of the rise in
unmarried share of births; this is dwarfed however by the contribution of the married share
which accounts for 45%. Alternatively we can ask how much smaller is the increase if hold
constant only the variable of interest. The results are in Columns 6-8; holding the unmarried
birth rate constant the increase in the share is 44% smaller, and holding the married fraction
constant, 69% smaller. We conclude therefore that the birth rate plays an important role,
even though the decline in marriage plays a larger one.
As Akerlof et al. point out, most of the increase in the unmarried birth share, at least to
1980, can be attributed to the decline of “shotgun” marriages; those that were realized after
the conception of a child, as measured by the rate of marriages in which a baby is born less
than 9 months later. In Table 3 we decompose the change in unmarried birth rates to assess
the role of these shotgun marriages. The table uses mainly previously published statistics;
6Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present.
7Author’s computations from Census 1970/2000
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the sources are given in the table8.
We suppose there are two contraceptive methods, with associated pregnancy rates ⇡1
and ⇡2 and usage rates p1 and p2, respectively. Empirically, we associate these with highly-
eﬀective methods such as the pill and the IUD, versus older, less eﬀective methods such as the
condom and the diaphragm. The pregnancy rate of sexually active non-contracepting women
is ⇡0. Let the probability an unmarried woman is sterile be ps and that a non-sterile woman
is sexually active px. Let the probability a pregnant unmarried woman has an abortion be
pA and the probability that she marries instead by pM . The unmarried birth rate ⇡B can
therefore be written as
⇡B = (1  ps) px [⇡0 (1  p1   p2) + p1⇡1 + p2⇡2] (1  pA   pM)
The bottom row of Table 3 consists of the unmarried birth rate, as computed from the
statistics in the higher rows using the equation above. For the 1970s and 1990s columns the
computed birth rates turn out to be close to the reported means. The remaining rates were
computed while holding constant one of the variables from the equation. Thus in Column 3
we learn that holding the sexual activity rate constant would have caused a 40% decline, to
0.015, in the unmarried birth rate, despite the fall in the shotgun-marriage rate, because of
the increased usage of more eﬀective contraception. Holding the shotgun rate constant on
the other hand would have resulted in a 22% decline. In terms of understanding the birth
rates therefore it is the rise in unmarried sex that is the big player, not, contrary to AKYs
findings for the 1980s, the shotgun rate.
Finally, it is important to assess how important the shotgun marriages are relative to
marriages as a whole. For this exercise we draw on the NSFG samples for 1973 and 1995.
According to the survey design, the sample of married women is representative of age 15-44
women in the U.S.. We count the marriages in which a child was born less than 9 months
after the marriage; this is easily computed on the sample of married women who gave birth
during the period of interest, using the variables for month of marriage and month of birth.
We express this as a fraction of the number of women who married during the period of
observation, excluding marriages that occurred less than 9 months before the interview date.
The results are quite startling. First the fraction of marriages accounted for by shotgun
marriages is about 18% in the 1970-73 period, but the decline is quite small; in the 1995 the
rate is 14%. Second, when we divide the sample into old and young, and mothers versus
non-mothers, we find that the shotgun share declines for only one cell: mothers older than
8For 1970 it was necessary to conjecture the rates of contraception usage and sexual activity for unmarried
women; this was done on the basis of results from the NSFG, as described below. We also assume that the
sterility rate in 1970 was the same as that measured in 1995.
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age 25. Virtually all of the modest decline in the shotgun share of marriages is accounted
for by the fact that brides are older now and more likely to have had a previous child.
This suggests a relative stability of the role of the “shotgun norm” relative to marriage and
single-birth trends, contrary to the AYK hypothesis.
This does not rule out shotgun marriages playing an important role in understanding
the rise in the share of unmarried births, but the role of rising sexual activity plays a much
stronger role in understanding birth rates, and and the decline of marriage is even more
important than the rise in birth rates. The adoption of improved contraception has a strong,
direct and contrary eﬀect by reducing birth rates, so the other factors must sum up to a
powerful force of change indeed.
2.3 Sexual activity and contraception
Because the 1973 NSFG is not representative of the US women in the age 18-44 range, we first
consider the 1982 wave of the NSFG, where the sample is representative. Unfortunately, most
of the sexual activity information in the 1982 wave only goes back three months. However
women in the sample do report the age at which they first had sexual intercourse and also how
many months elapsed from that date to their first marriage. This allows us to compute the
fraction of women who first had sex while unmarried, by the age at which sexual intercourse
first occurred. We classify sex as married sex if it occurred less than three months before the
first marriage and unmarried sex otherwise. Because the NSFG sample is so large in 1982
(7969 women), we can split the sample into one-year age groups and report the fraction of
women who had had unmarried sex by a given age.
Figure 1 reveals a rapid transition in sexual experience in the years 1967-1971; over the
course of the entire sample, the fraction of women having had sex by age 18 nearly tripled,
rising from 20% for women older than 33 years to about 55% for 19-year olds. The problem
with this statistic is that it is not a direct measure of sexual activity rates, but if we think
of the age at first intercourse as the onset of more or less continuous sexual activity, then
this suggests a rapid rise in the sexual activity of unmarried younger women.
Comparing singles who are in the 1973 NSFG with the comparable population in the
1995 NSFG confirms that this increase in sexual experience is echoed by an increase in
sexual activity of previously married women. In addition we can observe a sharp increase in
the fraction of singles using highly eﬀective (“safe”) contraception methods, mainly the pill
and the IUD. While the 1995 wave is designed to be representative of the US population as
a whole, the 1973 wave excluded never-married women with no cohabiting own children.The
sample design implies that we are limited to considering two classes of unmarried women in
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1973: those who have been previously married and those with children.
In the 1973 survey we measure sexual activity from an interval-level variable that gives
the number of months without sex in the interval. 9 To construct the sex activity measure,
we compute the ratio of months without sex to the number of single, non-pregnant months
in an interval; the sex variable equals 1 minus this ratio. Since this is a proportion, rather
than an indicator, we then estimate our standard model by OLS.
For the 1995 survey, we have two sources of information; for each interval, we have the
start/end dates for up to four periods of sexual inactivity per interval, and we also have a
list of all male sexual partners over the last 5 years, along with the dates of the relationship.
We measure inactivity as the sum of months in an inactive interval plus months not in
recorded sexual relationship. This provides a lower bound on the number of months that an
unmarried, non-pregnant woman is having sex.
In the sample-means table, it is clear that the sexual activity rate was on average much
lower in the 1970s for unmarried women without children in the NSFG sample; 31% reported
being sexually active in a given year, compared to 76% of unmarried women with children
and 98% for married women. By 1995, 75% of unmarried women without children were
sexually active in the past year, nearly 2.5 times the rate of the 1970s sample. If the women
omitted from 1970’s sample were less likely to be sexually active than the unmarried women
in the sample then what we have here is a lower bound on the increase in sexual activity
rates of these women. Of course the composition of this cell has also changed over time.
They are older, 24 years instead of 21 on average, and more educated; 86% have finished
high-school, compared to 67% in the 1970s and 54% attended college, compared to 29%.
To see whether the apparent changes in sexual behavior go away after controlling for such
variables, we now turn to a probit analysis of for sexual activity of unmarried women.
We estimate probit regressions by month for sexual activity (1995) and the use of contra-
ception. The explanatory variables include indicators for whether the woman is cohabiting,
whether she was previously married and whether she graduated from high school, attended
college or attained a bachelor’s degree.10 The estimated coeﬃcients, which are shown in
Table AX in the appendix, are then used to construct predicted age profiles for each time
period, holding constant education and other characteristics. In the left-hand panel of fig-
ure 3(a) we show the predicted age profiles for 1970-73 and 1990-95 for sexual activity of
9An interval can be of two types: “pregnancy” and “open”; the latter refers to the time elapsed since the
last pregnancy if any. Pregnancy intervals are the time between the ending dates of each pregnancy.
10The 1973 wave does not record whether the respondent is attending school, nor her eventual attainment.
Instead we know her years of schooling completed. We assume she is not attending if her age exceeds years of
schooling by 6 years or more, while we use thresholds of 12 and 16 years as proxies for high-school graduation
and attainment of a bachelors degree, respectively.
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non-cohabiting, non-college women with no previous children or marriages. It is abundantly
clear that there has been a radical shift in sexual activity of these women; the age profiles
are quite flat and shift up from about 20% in 1970-73 to 80% in 1990-95. This picture of
radical change in sexual behavior is entirely absent in the right-hand panel, which shows the
sex profiles for single mothers. These women had high rates of sexual activity, around 80%,
in both the 1970s and the 1990s.
We conduct a similar analysis for the use of contraception. We see in the sample-means
table that contraception use increased dramatically for non-mothers. in 1969-72 only 16%
of the unmarried non-mothers in the sample women were using the pill; by 1995 this had
doubled to 32%. Even more than in the case of sexual activity, this is likely to be a lower
bound on the increase, since the excluded women are likely to using the pill at a much
lower rate; women who were previously married having had better access to the pill. A
similar pattern holds for whether women were using contraception at all; in 1969-72, 49%
of unmarried non-mothers were not using any reasonable method; this had fallen to 24% by
1990-95.
Again, Figure 4(b) shows the rise in contraception use for these women is robust to
controlling for age and education. Indeed the change is even more dramatic; for women
without children, the safe-method profiles shift up from 10% in 1973 to 40% in 1995 while
the no-contraception profile, evaluated at age 25, shifts down from 60% to about 30%. For
single mothers on the other hand, the changes are smaller, a rise from around 35% to 50%.11
2.4 Marriage and Birth Rates
The average marriage rates in Table 4 do not vary very much; 11% annually for non-mothers
in 1969-72, falling to 8% in 1990-95, while for mothers the rates are 9% in the earlier period,
falling to 8%. Birth rates decline modestly for married women (from 22% to 17%) and single
mothers (from 8% to 6%), but the dramatic change is of course those of unmarried non-
mothers, which more double, from 1.6% to 3.5% These are annual rates per single woman,
and so the averages maybe misleading because the composition of the singles pool varies
across the 4 samples of singles, as discussed earlier. In Figure 6 therefore we compare age
profiles of marriage and birth rates for unmarried women.
They show marriage rates for non-mothers have declined sharply; at age 25, the predicted
11The profiles for pill use and not contracepting (not shown) yield a similar story. For single mothers, the
fraction using the pill did increase, but only by about a third, from 30% to 40%, at age 25, while the fraction
not using contraception declined slightly from about 35% to about 30%. An interesting diﬀerence between
the two types of single women is that the role of other safe methods is more important for single mothers;
this is due to the rise of female sterilization as a contraception method. Presumably this method is more
appealing to women who already have children because they are less likely to want children in the future.
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marriage rate for a woman without college education fell from 24.4% in the 1973 NSFG to
13% in the 1995 wave. However, if the woman already had a child, then the changes over
time are much less pronounced: the marriage rate at this age declines from 12% to 11% and
in fact for all higher ages is actually higher in the 1990s.
The predicted birth rate for non-mothers at age 25 rose more than the average: from 2%
to 5.5%, an increase of roughly 170% of the initial rate. The response of single mothers is
more muted and of the opposite sign: birth rates fell from 17% to 11%, a decline of about
55%. Note that the contrast in unmarried birth rate responses of mothers and non-mothers
is exactly what one would expect under our hypothesis if sexual activity rates for women
with children was already very high before they had improved access to more eﬀective birth
control.
For married women, we also report in the appendix (Figure A2) the profiles for birth
rates, as in Kennes and Knowles (2010). We see that married birth rates are strikingly
uniform between periods and whether there is a previous child, declining in all cases from
around 25% when the wife is in her early 20s. Of course in families with two children the
birth rates are much lower, about 11% in both years.12
It is perhaps worth stressing that the method of this section controls for shifts in both
cohabitation and education, as well as for the shift in age diﬀerences between women with
and without children, features of the data that are apparent from Table 1. Overall the
marital transition appears to be reflecting changes in behavior of women without children;
the relative stability of single-mother behavior is a challenge for models of fertility and
marriage that was first identified in Kennes and Knowles (2010).
3 EXAMPLE
Before proceeding to the main model, we present an example to illustrate the mechanism by
which contraception technology influences birth rates for unmarried women. The example
also shows how the payoﬀ probabilities for men and women depend on the participation rates
in the sex market, which in turn are going to depend on the opportunity costs for each sex,
most obviously the benefit of pursuing more stable relationships that lead to marriage.
12The stability of marital fertility is consistent with the fact that that married birth rates declined slightly
over the period, from 9% to 8% annually, according to Ventura and Bachrach (2000), because of the rising
education levels of women; more educated women have lower birth rates, but in this paper, we abstract from
variation in education levels.
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3.1 The matching model
The economy lasts one period and is comprised of 2 continua, each of unit mass, of identical
singles of each sex,M,W . There are two markets for matches between agents of the opposite
sex; the sex market and the marriage market. Men pay a deterministic participation cost
  > 0 to join either market, while women pay an iid stochastic cost ⇠F , with CDF F (⇠F ) ,
to enter the sex market.
The timing of decisions in the example is as in Figure 6, except that in the example there
is only one period. At the start of the period, markets open and women learn how much it
would cost to enter the sex market. Having chosen a market, men and women then learn
whether they are matched. Those who are matched in the sex market have sex, which entails
a risk of having a child outside of marriage.
Each market operates according to the urn-ball mechanism: the men in each market are
allocated randomly to the women. Let the number of agents of sex s in each market n be
Nns . Define the “queue length” or “market-tightness” as  n ⌘ NnM/NnW .
The surplus from matching is parametric: it is equal to Sm should the match occur
in the marriage market, and Sx should it occur in the sex market. The allocation of the
surplus is determined by a second-price auction mechanism: women auction the match to
the men: for women who have one suitor, the entire surplus is awarded to the husband,
while those women with more suitors get the surplus. The urn-ball mechanism implies that
the probability a woman has z suitors is given by !z ( n) = (1+z) exp(  )z! . A woman has no
suitors with probability !0 ( ) = e   , is matched with probability 1 !0 ( ) = 1  e  , and
has more than suitor with probability 1  !0 ( )  !1 ( ) = 1  (1 +  ) e  .
In the sex market, a matched couple has sex and creates the surplus Sx. The man
is awarded the surplus with probabilitypx ( x) ⌘ !0 ( x), conditional on participation,
while the probability that it is awarded to a woman, conditional on participation, will
be designated qx ( x) ⌘ [1  !0 ( x)  !1 ( x)]. In the marriage market, a matched cou-
ple is allowed to marry with probability ⇡z. Therefore a man is awarded the surplus with
probabilitypm ( m) ⌘ !0 ( n) ⇡z, conditional on participation, while for a woman, the prob-
ability is qm ( m) ⌘ [1  !0 ( m)  !1 ( m)] ⇡z.
3.1.1 Optimality Conditions
If each market is active, then the indiﬀerence condition below must hold for men:
pm ( m)S
m = px ( x)S
x (1)
Assuming that men are in excess supply implies that men who prefer not to participate
13
in the sex market will be indiﬀerent between participating or not in any active market:
p ( m)S
m     = 0 (2)
px ( x)S
x     = 0 (3)
The indiﬀerence condition for women is
q ( x)S
x   ⇠F = q ( m)Sm (4)
.
3.1.2 Equilibrium
A matching equilibrium consists of two queues { ⇤m, ⇤x} , and a sex-participation threshold
⇠⇤F such that the economy satisfies the above optimality conditions and a resource constraint.
The resource constraint is that the demand for women equals the supply, which can be written
as NxW +NmW  1.
Using these conditions, it is easy to show that, so long as men are in excess supply, the
queue and the mass in the sex market will increase together in response to an increase in Sx
or a decline in Sm. Using (2)
p ( m) =
 
Sm
. Similarly, using (3) we have:
p ( x) =
 
Sx
. Using the definitions of the surplus probabilities, we can solve for the queue length in the
each market:
 ⇤m = log
⇡zSm
 
(5)
 ⇤x = log
Sx
 
(6)
. Now using (4) :
⇠⇤F = q ( 
⇤
x)S
x   q ( ⇤m)Sm (7)
, which implies a unique value for ⇠⇤F , so the mass of women in the sex market is F (⇠⇤F ),
and that of men F (⇠⇤F ) ⇤x.
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Combining all three expressions gives:
⇠⇤F = q
✓
log
Sx
 
◆
Sx   q
✓
log
⇡zSm
 
◆
Sm
The function q is strictly increasing: as the surplus from sex increases the participation rate
of women in the sex market will increase, and the marriage rate will decline.
3.2 Birth Control
So far we have ignored the determination of the surplus Sx. We now put some structure on
this by assuming that the birth of a child to an unmarried woman entails a benefit  V that
may be positive or negative. We let the probability of a birth, conditional on unmarried sex,
be ⇡Bs and the utility from sex be ux; the surplus is Sx ( V ) ⌘ ux+⇡Bs  V. We set  V < 0 ;
this means we can interpret ⇡B as the failure rate of the birth control technology. Therefore
a decline in ⇡Bs would make women more likely to participate in the sex market.
First note that since we are assuming only matched women have sex and therefore can
give birth, the observed birth rate to unmarried women in the model is:
cs ( 
⇤
m, 
⇤
x, ⇠
⇤
F ) =
F (⇠⇤F ) (1  !0 ( ⇤x)) ⇡Bs
F (⇠⇤F ) + (1  F (⇠⇤F ))!0 ( ⇤m)
(8)
. Let ⇡Bm be the conditional birth rate to married women. We can think of the diﬀerence
between the two conditional rates as reflecting birth-control responses to diﬀerent incentives
to avoid births; this will be developed more explicitly in the full model.
The share of births accounted for by single women is
F (⇠⇤F ) (1  !0 ( ⇤x)) ⇡Bs
(1  F (⇠⇤F )) (1  !0 ( ⇤m)) ⇡Bm
(9)
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. Obviously if the equilibrium objects ( ⇤m, ⇤x, ⇠⇤F ) were all held constant, both the un-
conditional birth rate and the share of unmarried women would be increasing in ⇡Bs . In
equilibrium however, the response of ⇠⇤F , as given by (7), makes it diﬃcult to determine from
expressions (8) and (9) whether the share will rise or fall with an increase in ⇡Bs . We now
turn therefore to a numerical evaluation of expressions (8) and (9), using the equilibrium
conditions (5),(6) and (7), to determine ( ⇤m, ⇤x, ⇠⇤F ).
3.3 Unmarried births and the decline of Marriage
In Figure 7 we show some numerical results for this example, all plotted against the birth-
control failure rate ⇡Bs , which is set to range from 0.01 to 0.2, so as to include the range
from the averages for the Pill (0.05) to the average for condoms (0.15) and diaphgrams (0.20)
. The parameter values of the model, shown in Table 6, were selected in order to generate
a range of variation similar to the annual rates observed in the US data for the 1970s and
1990s, as summarized in Tables 2 and 3.
Panel (a) shows the unmarried share of births, which follows a hump shape, declining
from 45% to zero, and increasing only in the neighborhood of ⇡Bs = 0 . Doubling the standard
deviation of the sex cost distribution, from 0.5 to 1.0 results in a less-responsive series, but
the share still declines below 10% for a failure rate of 20%, which is roughly the average
for condoms and diaphgrams. Panel (b) shows that this pattern is similar to that of the
unmarried birth rate.
The unmarried birth rate, shown in Panel(b), follows a similar hump-shaped pattern,
declining from from 4% to zero, or in the case of the high-variance series, to 7.5%. Panel
(c) shows a rapid decline in the female rate of unmarried sexual-activity , from 60% to
zero; this is clearly the force driving the paradoxical decline of unmarried births. The
marriage rate, also shown in Panel (c), increases from about 10% to 30%. Panel (d) shows
that the aggregate birth rate is essentially stationary over the range in which contraception
eﬀectiveness increases the unmarried share of births.
The key features of the parameterization that generate declining participation rates in
unmarried sex are a large value of the enjoyment of sex (ux = 8), relative to the marital
surplus (Sm = 5), and an oﬀsetting strong distaste for unmarried births ( V =  20). 13
We conclude from this example that improved birth control can indeed account for the
main facts that motivate this paper: the rise in the unmarried share of births and the decline
of marriage. The model was also successful in explaining the rise of the unmarried birth rate;
13The other parameter values are : male participation cost   = 1 and log sex-cost distribution N (1.0, 0.5).
The married birth rate is set to ⇡Bm = 0.2 to approximate the birth rate of married women without children
in the 1960s. In order to reduce marriage rates to the empirical target, we set the matching friction pz = 0.5.
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the magnitude ranged from .01 to 0.04, similar to the empirical averages in Table 1.
It is not clear how plausible is the value of | V | required for the story to work. In a
dynamic setting, the eﬀect of an unmarried birth on continuation values is determined by
marriage probabilities which is likely to depend, through equilibrium considerations, on the
fertility behavior of both married and unmarried women. In Kennes and Knowles (2010),
we argued that the strong negative association in the 1970s between marriage rates and
unmarried motherhood generated incentives that may have been strong enough to explain
the lower rates of unmarried fertility that were then prevalent. This suggests using observed
marriage rates for single mothers to restrict the value of  V in a dynamic model of marriage.
Another crude simplification in the example was that unmarried sex precludes marriage,
but in real life there is no reason to believe this is the case. 14The example also abstracts
from the possibility of abortion, and from the choice of birth-control methods. In the model
developed below, we deal with all of these concerns.
4 THE MODEL
The population of agents consists of infinitely-lived adults, with a continuum of each sex
denoted by {M,F} and mass NM and NF . Women are of sex F and may produce up
to K > 0 children. There are three types of households; single males, single females, and
married couples. “Marriage” is defined as a match that lasts more than one period. Married
adults live together as husband and wife with all the children ever born to the female spouse.
Let k be the number of kids a woman has, and, in a married-couple household, let km  k
be the number of the husband’s biological (own) kids.
Agents can be either matched with men or unmatched. Each period, matched women are
assumed to have sex. Married women are matched by definition, while singles participate in
either of two matching markets: the “sex market”, and the marriage market. 15 Marriage can
ensue from matches in either market, but only in the sex market is pre-marital sex possible.
When matches are formed in the sex market, sexual activity will occur regardless of whether
marriage ensues. Women with k = K are not permitted to participate in either market. The
timing of participation decisions is as in Figure 6.
Life is divided into two discrete phases; active, and inactive. Children are born to active
women who are matched with men and have fewer than K previous children, at rates that
14Note that our fourth motivating fact, the decline of “shotgun marriage”, was identified by Akerlof et al.
(1996) as the main “cause” of rising unmarried births; this margin though is entirely absent in the example.
15The term market as used here is an abstraction that is not intended to imply payments for sex or marriage
partners. The idea, in the spirit of Gary Becker’s work on marriage, is that the equilibrium allocations depend
on the demand and supply of partners.
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are determined endogenously each period. During the active phase, unmarried agents can
match either for casual sex or to form marriages. Households exit permanently from active
status, i.e. "become sterile" with probability   each period. They are replaced by an equal
inflow of active unmatched agents, consisting of equal numbers of men and child-less women.
The population of singles therefore consists of new entrants and older agents who were single
last period.
4.1 Preferences
Utility within matched couples is perfectly transferable. Each period, each household type
generates an exogenous utility flow. These are designated uSM , uSF (k) and uM (k, km),
for, respectively, single males, single women and married-couples. Sex between unmarried
couples generates additional utility ux.
The critical assumption is that children generate more utility within a marriage than
without:
uSF (k + 1)  uSF (k) < uM (k + 1, km   1)  uM (k, km)
. Parents get less utility from step children than from their own children, so that an
additional child within a marriage raises the father’s utility more than a pre-existing child
would. To avoid additional complexity, we assume that children outside the household do
not enter the parent’s utility function.
Newly matched couples learn the value of their match quality, a one-period utility shock.
The stochastic process for match quality ✏ is assumed to be iid across matches, with cdf   (·)
if the couple has met in the marriage market , and cdf  x (·) if the couple has met in the sex
market.
We also assume that single men must pay a utility cost   > 0 to participate in either
market; while participation in the marriage market is costless for women, they face an iid
cost ⇠F of participating in the sex market.
4.2 Birth Control
The first step in developing a theory of birth control is to reconcile two canonical facts: 1)
most sexually-active married women are actively contracepting, even those without children,
and 2) most births to married women are not the unwanted result of accidental pregnancies.
Clearly having children is in general desired, and yet delaying fertility is equally important.
We postulate that the timing of children is very important; women contracept because most
of the time it is optimal to delay fertility. Rather than model explicitly the optimal timing
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of births, we add an element of uncertainty over the “wantedness” of children. This takes the
form of a one-time iid utility shock  that accompanies the birth of a child. Let the PDF of
 be g () and the CDF be G (). The total gain from having a child consists therefore of a
deterministic portion, which we label  V (k, km) and a stochastic portion  that is realized
at the time of the contraception decision.
We assume that in the absence of contraception, women who are sexually active will
become pregnant at rate ⇡ˆ 2 [0, 1]. Those couples who want to reduce the probability of
pregnancy can choose between two costly contraception methods, (✓1,↵1) and (✓2,↵2). Users
of method i become pregnant at rate ↵i⇡ˆ and incur utility cost ✓i. We assume that ✓1 > ✓2.
once a woman is pregnant, the couple can choose an abortion to terminate the pregnancy.
We assume that, at the time of the contraception decision, women are aware that abortion
will involve a iid utility cost ✓A , but that the realized value of that cost is only revealed at
pregnancy.
In the appendix, we derive the optimal birth-control behavior by working backwards from
the case of a couple where the woman is pregnant, given a realized abortion cost ✓A and a
realized child-utility shock . The result is a set of reduced-form “frontiers” that give the
optimal behavior as a function of  V . For instance the probability of birth is given by the
fertility frontier ⇡F ( V ), and the expected costs associated with sex, including the con-
traception and abortion costs associated with the optimal strategy, as well as the expected
impact on the continuation value is given by ⇥nk ( V ), where n 2 {m, s} indicates the
marital status and k the number of children the woman already has. These two objects are
all we need to know about birth control to solve the matching model, although other fron-
tiers, corresponding to the contraception and abortion choices, will be useful for calibration
purposes.
The resulting frontiers are shown in Figure 7, for the case where abortion is available
with probability 0.8 and where unmarried couples only have access to the pill (labeled as
CC2) with 50% probability.
Since pregnancy involves couples, and we are assuming eﬃcient outcomes, the actual form
of  V depends on the consequences for the couple. This is determined by the equilibrium
of the matching model.
4.3 Marriage
The marriage decisions can be summarized by the match-quality thresholds. Let the thresh-
old for a newly matched couple in the marriage market be ✏m (k, t) . As in the example,
the probability that matched couples who wish to marry are indeed allowed to marry is ⇡z.
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With probability [1    (✏m (k, t))] ⇡z the couple ends up marrying. If they do not marry,
the members of the couple spend the remainder of the period as single agents. We show the
timing of decisions for married couples in Figure 8(a).
The probability that a newly matched couple in the sex market ends up marrying is a
bit more complicated because in the sex market the decision can be conditioned on whether
the woman becomes pregnant. We show the timing of decisions for unmarried couples in
Figure 8(b). The match quality ✏ is drawn from a distribution with CDF  x. A matched
couple learns the realization of ✏ before the contraception decision. There are two relevant
thresholds {✏0 (k, t) , ✏1 (k, t)} . A couple with ✏ > ✏0 (k, t) will commit to marry regardless of
whether the woman becomes pregnant. However if ✏1 (k, t) < ✏ < ✏0 (k, t) then the couple
will commit to marry only if the woman becomes pregnant. The precise expressions for these
thresholds are derived in the appendix.
4.4 Frictional assignment
The matching markets are similar in spirit to those of the directed-search literature, such
as Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a). Each market consists of K + 1 submarkets, one for each
k 2 {0, 1...K} . All unmarried women with k children who decide to participate in a given
market are assigned to submarket k of the market in question. Unmarried people can also
choose not to participate in either market. The number of single-female households with
k children is denoted by NF (k, t). Of these women, a mass NxF (k, t) choose to enter sub-
market k of the sex market, while the mass NmF (k, t) choose to enter sub-market k of the
marriage market.
Men choose both which market and which submarket to enter. NmM (k, t) denotes the
number of men who enter sub-market k of the marriage market, while NxM (k, t) denotes the
mass of those who enter sub-market k of the sex market.
Each period there is random assignment of men to women within each of the sub-markets.
Let  jk (t) ⌘ N jM (k, t) /N jF (k, t) denote the queue-length for sub-market (j, k) . Each single
woman is assigned a random integer number of suitors z 2 N with probability !kz = !z ( k) .
This probability equals !0 ( k) = e  k for z = 0 , and  ke  k for z = 1. A man assigned to
a woman with z suitors will match with probability 1/z. On average the male matching rate
is equal to the number of matches 1  !0 ( k) divided by the number of men per woman  k.
As in the example, women auction the match to the highest bidder. In the sex market,
the probability that a man receives the surplus is therefore pxM ( k) ⌘ !0 ( xk), the probability
that he was the only bidder. Similarly, the probability that a woman matches is given by
[1  !0 ( xk)], the probability that she has at least one suitor, and the probability that she
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gets the surplus is pxF ( xk) ⌘ [1  !0 ( xk)  !1 ( xk)] ⇡z.
In the marriage market the surplus is only awarded if the marriage occurs. The probability
that a man receives the surplus is therefore pmM ( k, t) ⌘ !0 ( mk (t)) (1    (✏m (k, t))) ⇡z. The
probability that a woman marries is given by ⇡mF (k, t) ⌘ [1  !0 ( mk (t))] (1    (✏m (k, t))) ⇡z,
and the probability that she gets the surplus is pmF ( mk ) ⌘ [1  !0 ( mk )  !1 ( mk )] (1    (✏m (k, t))) ⇡z.
4.5 Expected payoﬀs
It is convenient to divide the period into the stage before and the stage after the matching
decisions. We use the superscript E to refer to the expectations as of the start of the period
("ex ante") and R to refer to the expectations as of the close of the matching markets, but
before fertility is realized. Let the eﬀective discount rate be denoted   ⌘  ˜ (1   ) .
4.5.1 Marriages
Let Y E (k, km, t) denote the expected value, on entering the period at time t, of a marriage
consisting of a woman with k kids of her own, of which km are fathered with her current
husband.
Define
 Vm (k, km, t) ⌘  uM (k, km) +   Y E (k, km, t+ 1) (10)
where for any function g (k),  g (k) ⌘ g (k + 1)   g (k) represents the eﬀect of having one
more child. For instance  uM (k, km) ⌘ uM (k + 1, kM + 1)   uM (k, kM). This represents
the deterministic component of the incentive to have children.
We can write the marriage value in terms of the flows we have just defined as: .
Y E (k, km, t) = u (k, km, t) +  Y
E (k, km, t+ 1) ⇥m ( V (k, km, t)) (11)
.
4.5.2 Singles
Singles, except for women with k = K , can enter either the marriage or sex markets, or
stay out of both markets .
Let the expected values on entering sub-market (k, j), for men and women respectively,
be denoted V ESM (k, j, t) and V ESF (k, j, t). Now we can define the values of single people on
entering the period:
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WESF (k, t) ⌘Emax
 
V ESF (k, x, t) , V
E
SM (k, j, t)
 
(12)
WESM (t) =Emax
k
 
max
 
V ESM (k, x, t)  ⇣M , V ESM (k, j, t)   
  
(13)
The continuation values for unmatched people, regardless of whether they entered the
markets, are V RSM (t) and V RSF (k, t) for men and women, respectively.
We can write the continuation value for single men as:
V RSM (t) = uSM +  W
E
SM (t) (14)
, while for a woman with k children,
V RSF (k, t) = uSF (k) +  W
E
SF (k, t) (15)
.
Value of Entering the Sex Market We derive in the appendix an equation for the
child-birth incentive  Vs (k, t) of a newly-matched couple in the sex market. The surplus of
a match in the sex market is:
Sx (k) ⌘ uxS  
ˆ
✏
⇥s ( Vs (k, t, ✏)) d  (✏) (16)
. The derivation of this expression, along with the definition of  Vs (k, t, ✏) is presented in
the Appendix, where the optimal marriage plan is solved for. Note that the value of any
marriages ensuing from the match are included in  Vs (k, t, ✏) .
. The (ex ante) expected value of a woman entering the sex market is:
V ESF (k, x, t) ⌘ V RSF (k, t) + pxF ( xk (t))Sx (k, t) (17)
, whereas for a man the (ex ante) expected value is:
V ESM (k, x, t) ⌘ V RSM (k, t) + pxM ( k, t)Sx (k, t) (18)
.
Value of Entering the Marriage Market A couple matched in the marriage market
will want to marry if and only if:
✏t > ✏
m (k, t) ⌘   ⇥um (k, 0) +  Y E (k, 0, t)  V RSF (k, t)  V RSM (t)⇤
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. The expected surplus from a marriage where the bride has k children is:
Sm (k, t) ⌘ um (k, 0) +  Y E (k, 0, t) + E (✏|✏ > ✏m (k, t)) 
⇥
V RSF (k, t) + V
R
SM (t)
⇤
(19)
. Given that a man has probability pmM ( mk (t)) of getting the marital surplus, the ex ante
net value of a man’s prospects in marriage market k is given by
V ESM (k,m, t) = V
R
SM (t) + p
m
M ( 
m
k (t))Sm (k, 0, t) (20)
. Similarly for single women with k children, the ex ante net value of entering the marriage
market is:
V ESF (k, t) = V
R
SF (k, t) + p
m
F ( 
m
k (t))Sm (k, 0, t) (21)
.
4.6 Solving the Asset equations
Consider women at time t with k children who are either single, or married without any
joint children. Suppose that we already know the queue lengths  xk (t) , mk (t), and the value
functions Y E (k, 0, t+ 1) , Y E (k + 1, 1, t+ 1) ,WESF (k, t+ 1) for the next period.
We solve for the current values by iteration on the following procedure. First, guess the
values Y E (k, 0, t) and WESF (k, t). This gives us values for the fertility incentives  Vs (k, t)
and  Vm (k, km, t). Equations (16) and (19) then allow us to compute the surplus functions
Sm (k, 0, t) , Sx (k, t), using equations (14) and (15) to substitute for V RSM (t) and V RSF (k, t).
This in turn allows us to compute Y E (k, km, t) from equation (??).
Now we use equations (17) and (12) to solve for WESF (k, t). This step provides us with
new values for the guess, so we can repeat the procedure until the values of Y E (k, 0, t) and
WESF (k, t) converge. Note that, due to recursivity of the model, we are solving sequentially
(one value of k at a time), so in this loop we are solving for only two unknowns rather than
a system of size 2(K + 1).
4.7 Market-Clearing
Suppose the surplus is greater in the sex market than in the marriage market. Given the
assumption that the cost support extends from zero to 1, then there will be some men who
strictly prefer the sex market to the marriage market. Let the threshold be ⇠⇤, so that only
men with ⇠ < ⇠⇤ participate in the sex market.
Let M ✓ {0, ...K   1} be the set of active marriage markets of type k. Consider an
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unmarried woman i with k children; if k 2 M, then she is indiﬀerent between the two
markets; this defines the sex-cost threshold ⇠⇤F (k, t) :
pmF ( 
m
k (t))S (k, 0, t) = p
x
F ( 
x
k (t))Sx (k, t)  ⇠⇤F (k, t) (22)
. For any k where both sub-markets operate, men must be indiﬀerent:
V ESM (k, x, t)    = V ESM (k,m, t)    = V RSM (t) (23)
, which in turn implies
pmM ( 
m
k (t))S (k, 0, t) = p
x
F ( 
x
k (t))Sx (k, t) (24)
. Since men also have the option of sitting out of all markets, the participation constraint
must be satisfied:
V RSM (t)   V ASM (25)
, where the autarky value equals the discounted flow of utility of single males: V ASM =
uSM/ (1   ).
There is also a resource constraint for each market, which we can express in terms of
demand and supply of single men. This constraint isX
k<K
[NxM (k, t) +N
m
M (k, t)]  NM (t) (26)
using the definition of queue length, we can write this as:X
k2{0,..K 1}
 xkN
x
F (k, t) +
X
M(t)
 mk N
m
F (k, t)  NM (t) (27)
4.7.1 Distributions
Let the mass of married couples currently in state (k, km) be M (k, km, t) and let the mass of
single women in state k be NF (k, t). In the appendix we show, followingKennes and Knowles
(2010), that the distribution of single women follows a linear law of motion of the form:
NF (k, t+ 1) = ak1 (t)NF (k, t) + ak,km (t)M (k, km, t) + d1 (k, t) (28)
, where ak1 (t) represents the probability that single women of k children undergo no tran-
sitions, ak,km (t) represents the probability that a woman in a married couple has no births,
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and d1 (k, t) the relevant terms for women with k   1 children.
Similarly, we can represent the law of motion for married women as
M (k, km, t+ 1) = c1 (k, km, t)NF (k, t) + c2 (k, km, t)M (k, km, t) + d2 (k, t) (29)
, where c1 (k, km, t) , d1 (k, t) and c2 (k, km, t) are coeﬃcients that depend on the marital/fertility
decisions.
4.8 Stationary Equilibrium
A stationary equilibrium of the matching model with free entry consists of the following
objects: a list of decision rules for sex {⇠⇤F (k)}k=K 1k=0 , fertility and birth-control cost fron-
tiers
 
⇡Fnk ( V ) ,⇥nk ( V )
 K 1
k=0
, n 2 {s,m} , marriage {"m (k) , "0 (k) , "1 (k)}K 1k=0 , rules
{NmM (k) , NxM (k)}K 1k=0 and {NmF (k) , NxF (k)}K 1k=0 for assigning singles to markets , and laws
of motion
n
TS (k) , {TM (k, km, q)}kkm=0
oK
k=0
for the distributions. These objects must satisfy
the following conditions:
1. Optimality. For every k < K:
(a) the decision rules for participation in unmarried sex are optimal: for each k, a
woman with realization ⇠F = ⇠⇤F (k) is indiﬀerent between her two submarkets.
(b) the frontiers ⇡Fnk ( V ) ,⇥nk ( V ) for fertility and birth-control costs are generated
by optimal decision rules for contraception and abortion, given  V
(c) newly-matched couples at the thresholds {"m (k) , "0 (k) , "1 (k)} are indiﬀerent
between marriage and finishing the period as unmatched singles.
2. Market-clearing:
(a) the assignment rules imply queue lengths such that men are indiﬀerent across all
active submarkets
(b) free entry: men are not made strictly better oﬀ by participating in any market
3. Aggregation:
(a) The laws of motion of the distributions of agents over states aggregate the indi-
vidual decisions; i.e. they solve equations (28) and (29).
(b) Stationarity: The distributions are the fixed points of their laws of motion.
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4.9 Solving the Model
The model is solved for the stationary equilibrium by iteration. Taking { mk , xk} as given, we
can solve the asset equations for each level of k separately by backwards induction from k =
K . Given the complete system of decision rules, we then solve for steady-state distributions,
starting from k = 0. This yields new values of { m, x} , inferred from the market-clearing
conditions. We then repeat the procedure using the new values until they converge. We
assume that men are in excess supply, so condition (27) will not bind. Therefore condition
(25) binds in equilibrium. Since all marriage markets yield men the same value ex ante,
men will be indiﬀerent between either market and sitting out. The reservation value V RSM
therefore equals the autarky value.16
The first step, given a guess on { m, x}, is to find the surplus vectors
n
Sx (k) , {Sm (k, 0, q)}Nqq=1
oK
k=0
.
This requires that we know the value functions, which are given by the asset equations. Due
to the directed-search nature of the model, the decision rules in the markets for women
with k children depend on the rest of the economy only through the values of the market-
clearing vectors { mh , xh}K 1h=k+1 , which determine the value functions associated with having
additional children.
To solve the asset equations for a given level of k, we first iterate on the vector of
values of women without husband’s children,
⇥
V RSF (k) , {Y (q)}
⇤
. Given our guess on the
values vector, it is easy to solve for the optimal fertility rules for the given level of k. Once
we have the policy rules E⇡SFk and
 
⇡D (k, km, q) , E⇡MFk,km (q)
 nq
q=1
, we can write the asset
equations relevant to the marriage market for women with k children as a square linear
system of dimension (Nq + 1); the equations for k0 < k are irrelevant, and those for k0 > k
are independent of k and so appear only in the constant term. Solving this system produces
the next guess for the values vector, so we iterate on this procedure until we find a fixed
point. The solution to this system allows us to solve in a similar way the smaller system of
equations for the values of households in which husbands children are present; we nee this
to solve the asset equations for households without husband’s children and k   1 children.
The details of these linear equations systems are in the appendix.
16Suppose instead that single men strictly prefer participation in marriage markets: V ESM > V RSM . Another
way to think of this is that there is excess demand for husbands; the supply constraint (27) binds. In that
case there is some reservation value V RSM > V ASM that will generate a vector of queue lengths { xk, mk } such
that equation (27) holds with equality.
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5 CALIBRATION
Since our goal is to explore the impact of contraception on sexual behavior, we now consider
specifications of the model such that the model’s predictions for marriage, sexual activity and
birth rates approximate the analogous statistics in US data. As in the empirical and example
sections above, we begin with a very simple analysis, taking advantage of the fact that our
model nests more simplified views of the problem. We first calibrate a minimal version of
the model, and then explore the impact of improved unmarried birth control in that context.
We then proceed by adding in one margin at a time, along with the corresponding statistical
targets.
A specification of the model consists of functional forms and parameters. The parameters
can be divided into three sets; “fixed” parameters, whose values can be pinned down directly
from empirical observations or convention, “normalized” parameters, those that will be held
fixed at arbitrary values, and “free” parameters, whose values will be set so as to minimize
the distance between the targets and the relevant model statistics.
For each candidate parameterization, we simulate a cohort of 10,000 women from age
18 to age 44 using the decision rules and stochastic processes implied by the benchmark
model and compute the relevant moments from the simulated population. We then set the
score equal to the average deviation between the moments of the model and the targets,
and update the choice of parameters, repeating the process until the numerical solver finds
a minimum of the score, as measured by a Euclidean metric..
We take as targets the mean behavior conditional on the number of children. We choose
our targets from the 1973 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG). In order not to
confound the eﬀects of changes in the distributions of single women over education and
cohabitation, whether over time or by number of children, we use as targets the predicted
means for a given age-interval from the age profiles we derived in the empirical section above.
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5.1 Model Specification
5.1.1 Functional Forms
The distribution   of the female cost of participation in the sex market is assumed to be log
normal; the log of ⇠F is normally distributed with mean and standard deviation (µ⇠,  ⇠). The
17Although the NSFG is larger and more complete in the 1995 wave (for instance, unmarried non-mothers
are not excluded from the sample), we use statistics from the earlier wave because it is more informative
about singles behavior with access to the pill limited by law, whereas in the 1995 wave selection into pill use
on unobservables would more of an issue.
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distribution of the child-utility shock  is assumed to be normal with parameters (µ,  ).
The abortion cost has a log-normal distribution with parameters (µA,  A). The match quality
distribution is normal with mean and standard deviation (µm✏ ,  ✏) for married couples and
singles who meet in the marriage market. When matching occurs in the sex market, the
mean of the match quality distribution is µx✏ < µm✏ .
The utility flows generated by diﬀerent household types are parameterized as linear func-
tions of the number of children. Thus married households without children receive utility
flow ↵m single households without children receive utility flow ↵s. The first child increases
utility by ↵0W , for single households, and by ↵0W + ↵0M if married. The arrival of additional
children increases utility of single households by ↵1W and that of married , if the child arrives
inside the marriage, by ↵1W + ↵1M . The marginal eﬀect of an additional child born previous
to the marriage is ↵1W + ↵2M .
UM (k, kM) = ↵
0
M + ↵
1
MkM + ↵
2
M , (kM   k) + ↵3M (kM   k)2
UF (k, kM) = ↵
0
W + ↵
1
Wk
5.1.2 Fixed Parameters
As in Kennes and Knowles (2010), the probability   of exiting the active state is set so as to
replicate the average number of years a woman spends in the reproductive state, which we
take to be 20.45 fecund years per woman, so we set   = 0.05. We set   = 0.96, the standard
value for the discount factor at annual frequencies in the macroeconomics literature.
The natural fertility rate ⇡ˆk, is assumed to be a declining function of the number of
children, ⇡ˆk = f0/(1 + kf1). This reflects the decline with age observed in the literature,
such as Trussell andWilson (1985), who infer from a population of married women in England
from the 16th to the 19th centuries, a natural (non-contracepting) birth rate of roughly 80%
annually for sexually active women under age 25. We therefore set f0 = 0.8, and choose
f1 = 0.29 to match the rate of decline of annualized pregnancy rates, by number of existing
children, of non-contracepting, sexually active married women in the 1995 NSFG.18
The eﬀects of contracepting on the pregnancy rate are set to ↵1 = 0.2 (inferior technology)
to match the average for condoms and diaphgrams, the two most eﬀect methods available
in 1970 apart from the pill, and ↵2 = 0.08 which is the average annual pregnancy rate for
sexually active women on the pill in the 1990s.
We limit the availability of the pill and of abortion in the 1970s by setting the probabilities
⌧ sp = 0.25 for singles and ⌧A = 0.2 for all. Married women are assumed to have easier access
18The pregnancy-rate of non-contracepting married women rate declines in the NSFG from 0.38 at k=0
to 0.15 at k=5.
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to the pill, so we set ⌧mp = 0.75. This is admittedly arbitrary; it seems plausible that access
to contraception and abortion was less than perfect in the 1990s, and much less so in 1970.
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the problem is explaining why married women in the 1970s and unmarried women in
the 1990s often use other contraception methods. In the model this can be explained by
diﬀerences in the incentives to avoid pregnancy, due to diﬀerent realizations of the child
utility shock  , or by imperfect access to the pill.
5.1.3 Normalized Parameters
The male participation cost is normalized to   = 1, the sex-cost mean µ⇠ to zero, the utility
↵m0 of married life without children and the women’s utility ↵0W from a first child to zero,
the mean of match quality µm✏ for married couples to zero, and the standard deviation  A of
the abortion cost to one.
5.1.4 Free Parameters
When K = 1, the calibration will determine values for the following free parameters: utility
of single life ↵s standard deviation of match quality  ⇠ , the child-utility shock parameters
(µ,  ), and ux the direct utility generated by having sex. In addition, when these margins
are active, the contraception and abortion costs (✓1, ✓2, µA), and the mean µx✏ of the match-
quality distribution that governs shotgun marriages. Finally, when K > 1 , the calibration
will also determine values for the the taste parameters that govern the flow of utility from
additional children (↵1M ,↵2M ,↵1W ).
5.2 Targets
Relative to previous models, the contribution of the method used here is that we can calibrate
to annual transition rates, such as marriages, and births, as well as rates of sexual activity
and contraception usage. Our model is not expected to do particularly well as a theory of the
lifecycle in terms of the shape of the age profiles, as we have no aging within the population
of active people20. The targets are based on the age profiles, as computed in the empirical
section. For the purpose of understanding marriages and births, the important part of the
19The results of a recent (July 2010) poll by Planned Parenthood suggests that one in three
women voters—including 55 percent of young women—have struggled to aﬀord prescription birth
control. http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/survey-nearly-three-four-
voters-america-support-fully-covering-prescription-birth-control-33863.htm
20Knowles and Vandenbroucke (2013) do fit age profiles, using an otherwise simpler version of KK2010,
by allowing for stochastic transitions between age groups.
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profiles are the mid 20’s, so we take as targets the mean annual transition rates over ages
21-28.
Not all targets are derived from the estimated age profiles. In the case of abortion, there
are widely-acknowledged issues with under-reporting in the NSFG surveys, so we target
the aggregate ratio of abortions to pregnancies, as documented by Akerlof et al. (1996) for
1965-70, and Ventura (2009) for the 1990s.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Specification 1: the simplest model
Our simplest specification of the model assumes away abortion and shotgun marriages. We
also assume, for now, that in the 1970s only the less-eﬀective contraception method is avail-
able. We set K = 1, so that only women with no children are active. This model extends the
example model by allowing for an infinite lifetime, and endogenous choice of contraception
by both single and married couples. The surplus values from matching in each market are
now jointly determined and people have many opportunities to match. The free parameters
in this case are {↵, µ,  , ux}.
We calibrate the model to four moments for women in the 1973 NSFG who are high-school
graduates aged 18-28, without children: the marriage rate (0.26), the birth rate to married
couples (0.3) , the birth rate to singles (0.03), and the contraception usage rate if married
(0.5). This results in Model 1, as shown in Table 8(a) ; the parameter values are shown in
Table 7, column 1. The negative value for ↵0m indicates a gain of 0.4 for married couples
with children; the gain for unmarried women, set to ↵0w = 0, is not shown. The utility eﬀect
of being single is -0.51; however as the gain from sex is relatively large, 12.9, this does not
imply an unconditional preference for married life. The importance of timing of children is
indicated by a large absolute value of the mean, µ = 9.9, for the child-preference shock.21
When comparing parameter values, it is useful to bear in mind that some parameters, such
as , ux, are one-time shocks, while others, such as ↵0m,↵0w,↵2m are recurring.
We then take the calibrated model and introduce the more eﬀective contraception method,
CC2, calibrating the cost ✓2 and the singles-access probability µ2 to match the 1990s Pill-
usage rates of married (0.38) and singles (0.37). In the resulting parameter set, the Pill
costs 3 times as much as the less-eﬀective technology, and unmarried have only a 40% of of
obtaining the pill when they need it. Despite this, the main result is that, as in the one-
period example, introducing the contraceptive pill drives down the marriage rate and raises
21The distribution has mean -µ.
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the unmarried birth rate, generating values close to the empirical means for the 1990s. This
is remarkable, because the example result was driven by an exogenously high impact of chil-
dren on the value of being an unmarried woman; now not only is this (partly) endogenous,
but we have just shown it to be consistent with realistic marriage and birth rates.
Of course it should be noted that the initial condition is more of an analog to the 1950s
than the 1970s, since we are not allowing married women to use the pill in the benchmark
calibration. We will revisit this below.
6.2 Specification 2: shotgun marriages
We now repeat the procedure used for specification 1, with an additional margin; marriages
can arise from matchings in the sex market. We add one free parameter to the mix; the
mean of the match-quality distribution, µx✏ , along with an additional target, the shotgun-
marriage/pregnancy rate of the 1970s. The parameters of this calibration are shown in Col-
umn 2 of Table 7, and the empirical targets for the 1970s in Table 8(b). The parametrization
now implies a much lower value for the utility from sex, 7.4 instead of the 12.9 required in
the first specification, because the shotgun option reduces the fear of pregnancy in the sex
market.
The experiments in the right side of the table show that the model can match either the
decline of the shotgun rate, or the decline of the marriage rate, but not both together. The
main result is Column “Calib 1” in the 1990-95 section of the table. There the experiment is
exactly as the one in Table 8(a); the cost of CC2 and the access probability for unmarried
women are both reset so that the model matches the pill-usage rate of non-mothers by
marital status. As in the earlier experiment, the marriage rate declines and the UM birth
rate increases, but the shotgun rate barely moves. In Column “Calib 2”, we also allow the
mean of the match-quality distribution, µx✏ , to decline, so as to help the model match the
shotgun rate, but this actually drives up the marriage rate, as the sex market becomes much
less attractive. In fact it is not possible to reduce the match quality suﬃciently to generate a
realistic decline in the shotgun rate, because that would drive women out of the sex market
altogether. The problem is that improved contraception does not aﬀect the decisions of
women once they are pregnant, since there is no abortion, and with K=1, contraception is
irrelevant to mothers, regardless of marital status.
6.3 Specification 3: abortion
In Table 8(c) we re-calibrate the model to allow for abortion. We assume the mean cost of
abortion is zero and that the probability that an abortion is allowed has increased. For the
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experiment, only the abortion probability, the CC2 cost and the CC2 probability are allowed
to vary from their 1970s values. The calibrated parameters, shown in Table 7, Column 3,
imply that the probability of being allowed an abortion rises over time from 0.25 to .55; since
the corresponding abortion ratios are 0.2 and 0.5, respectively, this means 80% of pregnant
unmarried women in the model would have preferred to abort in the 1970s and 90% in the
1990s.
The results of the experiment are shown in Table 8(c). The calibration can replicate the
marriage decline and generates a slight decline in shotgun weddings, but instead of doubling
over time, the birth rate to unmarried women falls drastically, to less than a half of the
1970s level. The reason for this failure is clear; unmarried pregnant women always had
strong abortion incentives; by raising the value of unmarried non-mothers, the improved
birth-control regime has increased the incentive for abortion, and the higher probability
that abortion is permitted. AYK deal with this problem by assuming that women with
high abortion costs are drawn into sex by competition for husbands. An alternative to this
story is that life for unmarried mothers has improved relative to the value of remaining an
unmarried non-mother.
6.4 Specification K = 2
Suppose that women can have up to two children, and, for greater realism, let’s allow for
access to the pill in the 1970s. The additional parameters required for calibration, shown
in Table 9, are the marginal values of children for unmarried and married women, ↵1w,↵1m
, the cost and access probability of the pill in the 1970s, and the utility reduction imposed
on marriages by step kids, ↵2m. The corresponding targets are the birth rates to women
with one child, by marital status, respectively, the fraction of non-mothers using the pill in
the 1970s, by marital status, and the marriage rate of unmarried mothers with one child.
As might be expected, allowing unmarried mothers to match further reduces the penalty of
unwanted pregnancy, and reduces in turn the calibrated utility flow from sex, to 6.5, from
the value of 13 we saw in the first calibration.
As before, the experiment consists of re-setting the access probabilities for abortion and
the pill, as well as the cost of the pill, so as to match the usage rates of the pill and abortion
for the 1990s. The requirement that the model match the pill usage rates for the 1970s
and the 1990s has a lot of bite; the parameterization implies that there was only a small
increase in the accessibility of the pill for unmarried women, from 0.35 to 0.55, while the cost
actually has to increase, from 0.66 to 0.93 to match the lack of growth in married use rates.
In order to match the rise in the abortion ratio, the access to abortion doubles according to
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the calibration, from 0.35 to 0.755, which seems plausible given the change in legal status of
abortion over the period.
The results for the experiment, shown in Table 10, show that both the marriage and the
shotgun rates now decline together; accounting for about 60% and 72%, respectively of the
empirical changes, while the birth rate to unmarried non-mothers increases 75%, rising to
5.6%, equivalent to about 58% of the empirical increase.
This confirms the argument that motivates the paper, that improved birth-control could
account for the decline in the shotgun rate as well as the shifting birth and marriage rates.
The rate of sexual activity of the unmarried non-mothers rises from 26% to 61%, about 62%
of the observed change.
The results for unmarried mothers (of one one child) are more mixed, which is not entirely
unexpected, given that with K=2, they are the ones now facing exclusion from matching
markets should they have a child. In terms of the non-targeted statistics for the 1970s, the
model succeeds in generating a high sex-activity rate, about 71%, compared to a target of
74%, while the pill usage rate for married mothers is 60%, compared to 55% in the data.
The shotgun rate is 17% , compared to 25% for unmarried mothers in the 1970s; for the
1990s, the model generates a rate of 8.4% per pregnancy, very close to the 8.8% in the data.
However for sexually active unmarried mothers, the pill usage rate is only 22% in the model,
compared to 50% in the data. 22 The birth rates to unmarried mothers, decline in the model
from 18% to 10% whereas in the data the decline is more modest, from 17% to14.5%. This
suggests that, quantitatively, there are still gains to be had from allowing a higher maximum
number of children, but as there is no reason to expect a qualitiative change, we defer that
to future research.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The main contribution of the current paper was to develop a model of fertility decisions both
in and out of marriage over many periods. The other contributions of the paper include 1)
the argument is set in a model environment that is much richer in terms of lifecycle than
previous models, so it can be much more easily calibrated to annual data than the two-
period models that are usually used in the literature on marriage and fertility. The model is
based on directed search, so the ineﬃciency results that characterize random-search models
do not apply here. 2)The model is based on an equilibrium with competing markets, a new
thread in the search literature. As in Kennes and Knowles, 2010, our structure allows for an
22This suggests that unmarried mothers were more like married women in terms of access to the pill, so it
may be more realistic in future to assume the restriction on the pill applies only to non-mothers.
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equilibrium analysis with irreversible children; unlike that paper, we consider an alternative
to marriage, the “market” for unmarried sex.
Our one-period example suggests that improved birth control for single women is a plau-
sible story that can potentially explain all of the shift in marriage and unmarried birth rates.
Improved access to birth-control explains the fall in marriage rates and the rise in unmarried
birth rates, through an increase in the value of casual sex for unmarried women. We found
that this insight carries through to a life-cycle model, calibrated to US data, in which only
women without children could participate in the marriage and sex markets. However as AYK
point out, one of the most important margins in the unmarried birth rate is the probability
that unmarried pregnant women will marry; as in AYK we refer to this colloquially as the
rate of “shotgun” marriage. This simple version of the model could not match simultaneously
the decline of the shotgun rate and the rise in the unmarried birth rate. We saw that this was
because when single mothers are shut out of the matching markets, liberalizing birth-control
made the penalty for unmarried motherhood more severe.
We dealt with this challenge by allowing women with children to have more children and
to participate in the marriage and sex markets. This contributed an important aspect of
realism to the model, as in the 1970s about half of unmarried births were to women with
children. We required the calibration to match marriage and births rates to women with one
child already, and the usage rates of the pill as well as the ratio of abortions to pregnancies.
Despite these additional restrictions, the model with multiple children demonstrated that
improved birth control could explain roughly 60% of the sexual revolution.
The growing share of children in single-parent households since the 1970s is not just a
function of unmarried births; rising divorce rates also create single-parent families. Our anal-
ysis only addresses the unmarried-births aspect, and within that, the role of improvements in
birth-control technology; this narrow scope is justified, we feel, by the technical challenges.
Repeated opportunities to remarry and to have children were critical for our analysis; to
get there we abstracted from important features such as aging, human-capital investment
in children or the impact of means-tested government transfers. There are also important
features of marriage, such as divorce, and the margin between cohabitation and marriage,
that are ignored by both the current paper and the bulk of the related literature23. However
it is easy to see that the approach used here can be extended to deal with these and other
features of marriage and fertility.
Single-parent families are also a recurring issue in the design of social policy. Although
23As a first pass, this neglect is not entirely unjustified, as cohabitation for many appears to be a form of
extended courtship rather than a substitute for marriage. Spain and Bianchi (1996, p. 49) state that the
majority of marriages formed since 1985 began as cohabitation. Overall, they say, cohabitation accounts for
6% of US households.
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our analysis included children, the model, is far too abstract in this respect to consider the
consequences of the marriage-fertility transition on children’s welfare. To what extent the
current model can be extended to deal with the welfare issues associated with child raising
remains an open and important question for further work in this area.
8 APPENDIX
[See separate on-line document]
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1970 1995
Share of births due to unmarried women  0.1 0.3 200%
Fraction of kids in single mom households  0.13 0.22 69%
Fraction of mothers unmarried              0.11 0.25 127%
Fraction of kids living with Both Parents          0.82 0.62 -24%
Birth Rate to unmarried women  0.027 0.046 70%
Data
% ChangeStatistic
Table 1: Changes in Aggregate Marital Indicators . Fraction married based on Census 
computations for  women aged 18-44. Single mothers based on Living Arrangements of 
Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present. Umarried birth share from NCHS Data 
Brief  No. 18,  May 2009.
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1973 1995 Married Fraction
Married Birth 
Rate
Unmarried 
Birth Rate
Married 
Fraction
Married 
Birth Rate
Unmarried 
Birth Rate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fraction married                           0.740 0.530 0.530 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.530 0.530
Birth Rate to married women  0.100 0.085 0.100 0.085 0.100 0.085 0.100 0.085
Birth Rate to unmarried women  0.027 0.046 0.027 0.027 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.027
Unmarried Share of Births
Computed 0.087 0.324 0.193 0.100 0.139 0.160 0.290 0.220
Data 0.100 0.300
45% 6% 22% 69% 15% 44%
Holding ConstantVarying Only
Table 2: Decomposition of Unmarried Share of Births
Relative Size of Change
Statistic
Data
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Sex CC1 CC2 Abort/Preg Marr/Preg
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not Sterile 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Sexually Active 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
 Using CC1 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.09 0.24 0.24
Pregnancy| CC1 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15
 Using CC2 0.15 0.61 0.61 0.25 0.61 0.61 0.61
Pregnancy| CC2 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Pregnancy| No CC 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Abortion|Pregnancy 0.2 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.2 0.47
Marriage|Pregnancy 0.65 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.65
Births|Unmarried 0.026 0.048 0.015 0.105 0.068 0.070 0.020
1970 1990
Hold Constant
Table 3: Decomposition of the change in unmarried birth rates 1970-1995. Statistics are not all directly comparable, as 
sources differ in age-groups, methods and dates. Using CC1 value for 1970 is conjectured, so as to match unmarried birth 
rate
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1970 1995
Share of births due to unmarried women  0.1 0.3 200%
Fraction of kids in single mom households  0.13 0.22 69%
Fraction of mothers unmarried              0.11 0.25 127%
Fraction of kids living with Both Parents          0.82 0.62 -24%
Birth Rate to unmarried women  0.027 0.046 70%
Data
% ChangeStatistic
Table 1: Changes in Aggregate Marital Indicators . Fraction married based on Census 
computations for  women aged 18-44. Single mothers based on Living Arrangements of 
Children Under 18 Years Old: 1960 to Present. Umarried birth share from NCHS Data 
Brief  No. 18,  May 2009.
40
Single Married Single Married
Age 21.008 26.651 31.048 31.372
High-School 0.671 0.760 0.483 0.664
College 0.292 0.304 0.121 0.190
Degree 0.105 0.162 0.040 0.077
Prev. Mar. 0.026 0.082 0.273 0.107
Birth rate 0.015 0.222 0.079 0.099
Marriage rate 0.110 - 0.087 -
Cohabiting 0.000 - 0.001 -
Pill 0.158 0.342 0.204 0.252
Phys. Admin 0.002 0.017 0.075 0.069
No BC 0.485 0.364 0.219 0.154
Sexually Active 0.314 0.986 0.763 0.981
Single Married Single Married
Age 23.975 29.936 31.296 33.758
High-School 0.863 0.955 0.738 0.880
College 0.541 0.583 0.242 0.390
Degree 0.327 0.441 0.137 0.281
Prev. Mar. 0.087 0.102 0.559 0.199
Birth rate 0.035 0.169 0.060 0.077
Marriage rate 0.082 - 0.083 -
Cohabiting 0.038 - 0.082 -
Pill 0.324 0.278 0.182 0.149
Phys. Admin 0.012 0.008 0.045 0.022
No BC 0.236 0.362 0.259 0.162
Sexually Active 0.749 0.948 0.737 0.955
No Kids Mothers
No Kids Mothers
Table 4(a): Means of NSFG sample, 1969-72. Shaded areas are based on 
NSFG singles only. "Phys. Admin" refers to contraceptive methods 
administered by a physician, such as IUD. 
Table 4(b): Means of NSFG sample, 1990-95. "Phys. Admin" refers to 
contraceptive methods administered by a physician, such as IUD.
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1969-71 1990-95
No Kids 0.482 0.142
Kids>0 0.191 0.102
No Kids 0.144 0.102
Kids>0 0.064 0.062
0.450 0.100
1969-71 1990-95
No Kids 0.160 0.155
Kids>0 0.163 0.202
No Kids 0.082 0.080
Kids>0 0.074 0.058
0.150 0.112
Table 5(a): Shotgun Wedding Rate per Pregnancy 
Based on NSFG women aged 18-44.
Sub-Sample
Age <=25
Age>25
Full Sample
Sample Period
Table 5(b): Shotgun Wedding Rate per Marriage. 
Based on NSFG women aged 18-44.
Full Sample
Age <=25
Age>25
Sample Period
Sub-Sample
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Value
1 effect of kids on utility -20
2 utility from sex 8
3 mean of  sex-cost distribution 1
4 std of  sex-cost distribution 1
5 marriage surplus 5
6 Male participation cost 1
7 Married birth rate 0.2
1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990
alpha0_m
SinUtil
usf_x
mu_kappa
0.403 0.4 Cost_CC1
1.292 -- 1.25 -- 1.25 Cost_CC2
-- -- -- -- 1 0.65 AbortMean_1990
-- -- -25.691 -38.597 -24 -- mu_eps_x
-- -- -- -- 0.3 -- AbAllowProb1970
-- 0.395 -- 0.4 -- 0.98 Pill Prob
Table 7: Parameter values for calibrated models with K=1.
Parameter
Table 6: Parameters used in example.
(3)(2)(1)
0.403
Parameter
-0.407
-0.51
12.914
9.909
0.406
-0.396
-0.367
7.416
10.151
-0.396
-0.425
7.416
9
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Data Model Data Model
0.263 0.315 0.117 0.073 Marriage Rate
0.2 0.135 0.823 0.572 UM Sex Rate
0.03 0.037 0.071 0.112 UM Birth Rate
0.336 0 0.371 0.37 UM Pill Rate, No Kids
0.3 0.37 0.268 0.313 Mar Birth Rate
0.518 0 0.381 0.368 Mar Pill Rate
0.302 0.34 0.421 0.293 Mar No CC Rate
Data Model Data Calib 1 Calib 2
0.263 0.29 0.117 0.14 0.31 Marriage Rate
0.2 0.239 0.823 0.533 0.161 UM Sex Rate
0.03 0.035 0.071 0.052 0.025 UM Birth Rate
0.336 0 0.371 0.47 0.498 UM Pill Rate, No Kids
0.469 0.484 0.144 0.457 0.214 Shotgun Rate, No Kids
0.3 0.351 0.268 0.279 0.275 Mar Birth Rate
0.518 0 0.381 0.391 0.404 Mar Pill Rate
0.302 0.326 0.421 0.283 0.312 Mar No CC Rate
Women with no children
Statistic1970-73 1990-95
Table 8(b) Results with K=1;Extension to  shotgun weddings,  no Pill in 1970s.Shaded numbers are 
calibration targets. In Calib 1 the match-quality distribution is kept constant; in Calib 2 the match 
quality is allowed to deteriorate to match the shotgun rate.
Women with no children
Statistic1970-73 1990-95
Table 8(a) Results with K=1; No abortion, no shotgun weddings,  no Pill in 1970s. 
Shaded numbers are calibration targets.
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Target Model Target Model
0.263 0.256 0.117 0.13 Marriage Rate
0.2 0.231 0.823 0.532 UM Sex Rate
0.03 0.027 0.071 0.01 UM Birth Rate
0.336 0 0.371 0.376 UM Pill Rate, No Kids
0.469 0.417 0.144 0.37 Shotgun Rate, No Kids
0.3 0.316 0.268 0.161 Mar Birth Rate
0.518 0 0.381 0.394 Mar Pill Rate
0.302 0.359 0.421 0.304 Mar No CC Rate
0.2 0.209 0.5 0.529 Abortion Rate
1970 1990 Parameter
α2m Utility for  step-kids 
α0m Effect of no kids on married utility
α1w Marginal effect of kids on women's utility
α1m Marginal effect of kids on married utility
αs Utility effect of being single
ux Utility from sex
μκ Mean child-timing shock
θ1 Cost of CC method 1
0.663 0.93 θ2 Cost of CC method 2
μxε Mean match quality in sex market
0.35 0.754 μA Abortion access probability
0.347 0.55 μP CC2 access probability
Women with no children
Statistic1970-73 1990-95
Table 8(c) Results with K=1;Now with abortion, in addition to shotgun weddings,  
no Pill in 1970s. 
Role
Table 9: Parameters for model with K=2 and access to the Pill (CC2) in the 1970s.
1.005
-0.403
6.119
15.014
0.453
-7.09
-0.752
-0.499
0.348
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Target Model Target Model Target Model Target Model
0.263 0.281 0.117 0.196 Marriage Rate 0.144 0.156 0.103 0.13
0.25 0.271 0.823 0.621 UM Sex Rate 0.744 0.711 0.827 0.738
0.03 0.032 0.071 0.056 UM Birth Rate 0.171 0.18 0.145 0.1
0.336 0.26 0.371 0.351 UM Pill Rate 0.503 0.22 0.414 0.264
0.469 0.418 0.144 0.185 Shotgun Rate 0.25 0.173 0.088 0.084
0.3 0.212 0.268 0.199 Mar Birth Rate 0.253 0.233 0.258 0.236
0.518 0.669 0.381 0.436 Mar Pill Rate 0.548 0.601 0.373 0.407
0.302 0.327 0.421 0.385 Mar No CC Rate 0.15 0.387 0.334 0.481
0.2 0.199 0.5 0.49 Abortion Rate
Table 10 Results with K=2; Pill in 1970s.  
Women with one child
1970-73 1990-95 1970-73 1990-95
Women with no children
Statistic
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Figure 1(a):  US Birth Rate per Unmarried Woman aged 15-44  
(annual per mil) and Unmarried Share of All Births. Based on 
Table 1 of Ventura and Bachrach(2000).
Figure 1(b):  UK Unmarried Share of All Births. Based on Birth 
Statistics - Historical Series of Statistics from Registrations of 
Births in England and Wales, 1837-1983, by Population Censuses 
& Surveys Office.
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Figure 2(a): Fraction of women who had unmarried sex by age 18 or 21. Based 
on author's computations from representative sample of women in 1982 wave of 
NSFG.
Figure 2(b): Sexually active fraction  of unmarried  NSFG 1973 sample. 
Fraction of unmarried, non-pregnant months with a sexual relationship.
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Figure 3(a): Probability that an unmarried woman with no children  has sex in 
a given month. Predicted age profiles for  non-pregnant women computed from 
regression equations estimated on NSFG 1973 and 1995
Figure 3(b): Probability that an unmarried woman with one child  has sex in a 
given month. Predicted age profiles computed from regression equations 
estimated on NSFG 1973 and 1995
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Figure 4(a): Probability that an unmarried woman with no children is using a 
highly-effective birth-control method in a given month. Predicted age profiles 
for non-pregnant women computed from regression equations estimated on 
NSFG 1973 and 1995.
Figure 4(b): Probability that an unmarried woman with one child is using a 
highly-effective birth-control method in a given month. Predicted age profiles 
for non-pregnant women computed from regression equations estimated on 
NSFG 1973 and 1995.
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Child-­‐Less	  Women Single	  Mothers
Figure 5: Estimated Age Profiles for Marriage and Birth Rates.  Single Women in the NSFG waves for 1973 and 1995. Re-weighting of  1973 sample as 
described in text to correct for omission of never-married singles with no live births. Controls in estimation include co-habitation and previous marriages.
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Figure 6(b): The timing of decisions by unmarried couples.
Figure 6(a): The timing of market decisions. 
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Figure 8a): Optimal birthrates of married versus singles. Figure 8b): Optimal birth-control probabilities of married couples
Figure 8c): Optimal birthrates of married versus singles, low 
marginal value of children
Figure 8d): Optimal birth-control probabilities of unmarried 
couples.
Figure 7(c): Example Results; Rates of marriage and unmarried 
sexual activity
Figure 7(b): Example Results; unmarried birth rate.
Figure 7(d): Example Results; aggregate birth rate.
Figure 7(a): Example Results; unmarried share of births and 
unmarried birth rate.
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